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THE CASE FOR A COORDINATED 
POLICY MIX OF WAGE-LED 
RECOVERY AND PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT IN THE G20
ECONOMIC MODELLING RESULTS PREPARED FOR THE L20* 
BY PROFESSOR OZLEM ONARAN, UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH, JUNE 2014
“A coordinated mix of polices in the G20 
targeted to increase the share of wages 
in GDP by 1%-5% in the next 5 years and 
to raise public investment in social and 
physical infrastructure by 1% of GDP in 
each country can create up to 5.84% more 
growth in G20 countries – compared to 
business as usual.”
T
he share of wages in national income (GDP) 
has declined by around 10 percentage 
points in the G20 countries over the past 
three decades (Onaran and Galanis, 2012).1 
As the propensity to spend of wage-earners is 
higher than that of profit-earners, the decline 
in the wage share has contributed to a defi-
ciency of demand in the global economy, and 
has been detrimental for growth and employ-
ment. Our findings show that a 1%-point 
overall decline in the wage share in the world 
leads to a decline in global GDP by 0.36%-
points. Details of the findings are summarized 
in Appendix A below. However, in the current 
context of deficient aggregate demand and 
significant output gaps the reverse is also true: 
1 The wage share is defined as labour compensation, adjusted 
for the labour income of the self-employed, as a ratio of GDP. For 
reference in  2013, the wage share was 65.8% in the EU, 60.7% in 
Australia (in 2012), 60.3% in the US, and 39.04% in Turkey according 
to data supplied by the European Commission (http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_finance/ameco).
In partnership with
a 1%-point increase in the wage share at global 
level could lead to a 0.36 % increase in the rate 
of growth in global GDP above the current 
trajectory. This shows that growth in the world 
economy on aggregate is “wage-led”.
In this paper, we set out the effects on growth 
of a policy scenario that begins to reverse the 
decline in the wage share and is supplemented 
by an increase in public investment in social 
and physical infrastructure. Table 1 summa-
rizes the effects of a coordinated policy mix 
in the G20 targeted to increase the share of 
wages in GDP over the next 5 years by 1%-5% 
points depending on the country and to raise 
public investment in social and physical infra-
structure by 1% of GDP in each country. As 
explained in the Appendix, the impact of the 
increase in the wage share on growth varies in 
different countries according to the structure of 
their economies, notably their investment, and 
export and import shares. The proposed policy 
mix takes account of this by proposing differ-
ential increases in the wage share by groups of 
countries. It nevertheless shows that growth in 
all G20 economies will be increased by a coor-
dinated increase in the wage share. 
The effects on individual G20 countries, as 
well as on the G20 as a whole are displayed 
in Table 1. Column A postulates increases in 
*The online version of 
the paper is available at 
www.tuac.org and  
www.labour20.org 
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the share of wages in GDP of between one 
and 5 percentage points according to the 
country across the G20 over five years. Coun-
tries are subdivided into three groups, starting 
with countries where growth is predominantly 
wage-led, including the Euro-area, the UK, the 
US, Japan, Turkey and Korea. Increasing the 
share of wages in GDP by 5 percentage points 
in these countries could result in a wage-led 
recovery offsetting any negative effects on net 
exports or private investment as the current 
characteristics of the economies indicate 
strong internal demand effects. The second 
group includes Canada, Mexico, Argentina, 
and India, where the wage share could be 
increased by 3% of GDP. While growth in these 
countries, when they are treated in isolation, 
is profit-led, a simultaneous increase in the 
wage share in the G20 (even at an equivalent 
amount in all countries) would lead to higher 
growth in these countries, as well. Finally, in 
the third group, including China, South Africa, 
and Australia, a modest increase in the wage 
share by 1% of GDP can be pursued as part 
of a coordinated policy package. In this last 
group, the effect of a rise in the wage share 
would have an impact on net exports, which 
at first sight would limit the policy space for 
wage increases. However, part of the policy 
mix is to raise public investment that in the 
short term would stimulate growth and in the 
medium term would lead to a rebalancing of 
these economies, making them less reliant on 
export demand, changing the structure of their 
exports towards less labour intensive goods as 
well as to goods with a lower price elasticity 
of demand in the medium term. This would 
help develop a more diversified economic 
structure, and thereby for potential for higher 
increases in living standards in the future. 
In a scenario of coordinated wage-led 
recovery, all countries can increase their 
growth and overall this could create 1.96% 
more growth in the G20 as a whole over the 
next five years, which is shown in Column B. 
Thus, a coordinated wage increase alone could 
almost achieve the target of the G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors to 
raise G20 GDP “by more than 2% above the 
trajectory implied by current policies over the 
coming five years”2. 
The effects of a coordinated public invest-
ment stimulus, i.e. increasing the ratio of public 
investment in physical and social infrastructure 
to GDP by 1% in each country are simulated 
under different assumptions about the size 
2. https://www.g20.org/australia_2014/finance_ministers_and_cen-
tral_bank_governors_meeting
of multipliers. Column C includes the country 
specific multipliers identified in Onaran and 
Galanis (2012). Column D shows the growth 
effects in each country and the G20 as a whole 
as an outcome of a coordinated (simultaneous) 
increase in public investment by 1% of GDP. 
The growth effects of a simultaneous public 
investment stimulus are significantly higher 
than those of an isolated stimulus in one 
single country, since the former involves 
cross-country interactions, i.e. international 
demand spill-overs. Column E shows the 
growth effects if the multiplier is assumed to 
be 1.22 in all countries. This multiplier value is 
based on the mean of a large sample of multi-
plier values for public investment (based on the 
literature, which has been reviewed by Gechert 
(2013)3). Finally, Columns F and G show growth 
effects under the assumption of a high value 
multiplier, 1.8, and a low value multiplier, 0.5, as 
used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2009) regarding the values of capital spending 
multipliers. The overall results confirm that a 
public investment stimulus of 1% of GDP in 
each country can lead to 1.94-3.88% higher 
growth in the G20 – compared to business 
as usual. 
Coming back to the initial goal to explore 
the effects of a policy mix, Columns H and K 
add the growth effects of this option under the 
assumption of different multipliers. The results 
show that a policy mix of coordinated wage 
increases and public investment stimulus can 
lead to higher growth in the G20 by: 
 m 3.9% under the assumption of the lowest 
multiplier of 0.5.
 m 4.4% under the assumption of a multiplier 
of 1.22.
 m 5.5% under the assumption of a multiplier 
of 1.8.
 m 5.8% under the assumption of our country 
specific multipliers (estimated in Onaran 
and Galanis, 2012).
In summary, a policy mix of raising the wage 
share (e.g. through well set minimum wages and 
widening the coverage of collective bargaining) 
together with increased public investment in 
social and physical infrastructure would give 
a significant stimulus to growth and, hence, 
employment over a five year period in G20 
countries. This is in addition to help achieve 
the crucial objectives of reducing inequality 
and achieving social, environmental, fiscal, and 
financial sustainability across the G20. 
3. Gechert (2013) reports the mean of 98 studies published between 
1992 to 2013, providing a sample of 1882 observations of multiplier 
values for public investment.
REFERENCES:
Gechert, S. (2013). 
What fiscal policy 
is most effective? 
A Meta Regression 
Analysis. IMK working 
paper 117.
IMF, 2009, Global 
Economic Policies and 
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Staff of the Internatio-
nal Monetary Fund, 
G20 Meeting of the 
Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, 
March 13–14, 2009, 
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TABLE 1: SCENARIO OF A WAGE-LED RECOVERY AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT STIMULUS IN 
G20 COUNTRIES
Notes:
1. Selected countries for which wage share data is available since 1970s.
2. Weighted average of growth in each economy
3. Onaran and Galanis (2012), Is aggregate demand wage-led or profit-led? National and global effects, ILO, Conditions of Work and 
Employment Series No. 31, Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/
wcms_192121.pdf
4. The mean of 98 studies published between 1992 to 2013, providing a sample of 1882 observations of multiplier values for public invest-
ment, Source: Table 1 in Gechert, S. (2013). What fiscal policy is most effective? A Meta Regression Analysis. IMK working paper 117.
5. The high value of capital spending multiplier reported in IMF 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/031909a.pdf
6. The low value of capital spending multiplier reported in IMF 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/031909a.pdf
WAGE  
LED-RECOVERY
COORDINATED PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
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POLICY MIX: COORDINATED 
WAGE-LED RECOVERY+PUBLIC 
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A B C D E F G H=B+D I=B+E J=B+F K=B+G
EURO AREA  
(12 COUNTRIES)
5 1,19 1,59 3,13 2,30 3,39 1,56 4,32 3,49 4,58 2,75
UNITED 
KINGDOM
5 1,06 1,20 2,37 2,04 3,01 1,18 3,43 3,10 4,06 2,24
UNITED 
STATES
5 4,55 2,08 5,29 3,16 4,66 2,64 9,84 7,71 9,21 7,20
JAPAN 5 0,77 2,41 6,46 3,38 4,98 3,23 7,23 4,15 5,75 4,00
CANADA 3 1,61 1,21 4,10 3,12 4,60 2,05 5,72 4,73 6,21 3,66
AUSTRALIA 1 0,11 1,41 1,99 1,72 2,54 0,99 2,09 1,83 2,64 1,10
TURKEY 5 3,42 2,21 4,87 2,69 3,97 2,44 8,30 6,11 7,39 5,86
MEXICO 3 0,79 1,11 2,73 2,28 3,37 1,36 3,51 3,07 4,16 2,15
KOREA 5 4,34 1,82 9,53 6,09 8,99 4,76 13,87 10,44 13,33 9,11
ARGENTINA 3 0,68 1,38 3,34 2,58 3,81 1,67 4,03 3,26 4,49 2,36
CHINA 1 2,01 1,23 6,06 4,33 6,39 3,03 8,07 6,34 8,40 5,04
INDIA 3 0,13 2,18 4,75 2,66 3,92 2,38 4,89 2,79 4,06 2,51
SOUTH AFRICA 1 0,75 1,49 3,71 2,75 4,05 1,85 4,46 3,50 4,80 2,60
GROWTH IN 
G20 (2)
1,96 3,88 2,42 3,57 1,94 5,84 4,38 5,53 3,90
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR 
WAGE-LED GROWTH
T
his section first summarises our most 
recent estimation results regarding the 
effects of the changes in the wage share 
on growth based on Onaran and Galanis (2012) 
for the major developed and developing G20 
countries, for which there is data for the wage 
share since at least the 1970s. These countries 
constitute more than 80% of global GDP. In 
this work, we also go beyond the nation state 
as the unit of analysis and discuss the global 
effects based on the responses of each country 
to changes, not only in domestic income distri-
bution, but also to trade partners’ wage shares. 
A change in the wage share of a trade partner 
affects the import prices and foreign demand 
for each country. This global dynamic is signifi-
cant, as pro-capital redistribution policies have 
been implemented almost simultaneously in 
many developed and developing countries in 
the post-1980s period. Because of this, we have 
experienced a global “race to the bottom” in 
the wage share.  
The empirical analysis is based on econo-
metric estimations of consumption, invest-
ment, exports, and imports. Consumption is 
estimated as a function of adjusted profits and 
adjusted wages. Our findings show that the 
marginal propensity to consume out of profits 
is lower than that out of wages in all coun-
tries; thus, a rise in the profit share leads to a 
decline in consumption. Private investment is 
estimated as a function of output and the profit 
share. To estimate the effects of distribution on 
net exports, we follow a stepwise approach: 
Exports are estimated as a function of export/
import prices, and the GDP of the rest of 
the world; imports as a function of domestic 
prices/import prices, and home country GDP; 
domestic prices and export prices are esti-
mated as functions of nominal unit labour costs 
and import prices. The total effect of a change 
in the wage share on exports encompasses the 
effects of nominal unit labour costs on prices, 
namely of prices on export prices, and of export 
prices on exports. The effect of a change in the 
wage share on GDP via international trade not 
only depends on the sensitivity of exports and 
imports to prices but also on the degree of 
openness of the economy (i.e., on the share of 
exports and imports in GDP); thus, in relatively 
small open economies, net exports may play a 
major role in determining the overall outcome; 
the effect becomes much lower in relatively 
closed large economies. 
The total effect of the decrease in the 
wage share on aggregate demand of house-
holds and firms depends on the overall impact 
on consumption, private investment and 
net exports of changes in functional income 
distribution. If the total effect is negative, the 
economy is termed “wage-led”; if the effect is 
positive, the regime is termed “profit-led”. 
Table A.1 summarises the effects of a 
1%-point increase in the profit share on 
consumption, investment, and net exports 
based on the estimations by Onaran and 
Galanis (2012). 
One finding stands out for all countries: 
When the profit share increases, the fall in 
domestic consumption outweighs the rise 
in private investment. Leaving exports and 
imports aside and looking at only the effects on 
domestic demand, i.e. the effects on consump-
tion and investment (in columns A and B), the 
negative effect in absolute terms of the increase 
in the profit share on private consumption is 
substantially larger than the positive effect on 
private investment in all countries. This means 
that demand in the domestic sector of econ-
omies, leaving the foreign demand aside, is 
clearly wage-led.4 Hence, domestic demand 
unambiguously contracts when the wage share 
falls and the profit share increases. However, 
the effects on net exports in Column C have 
a crucial role in determining whether the 
economy is profit-led. Column D sets out the 
total effect on private demand. Column E shows 
the total effects after the multiplier process: 
The initial change in private demand due to a 
change in income distribution leads to a multi-
plier mechanism, which affects consumption, 
investment, and imports. This magnifies the 
effects of a change in income distribution on 
aggregate demand further. If the total effect in 
columns D and E is negative, then the economy 
is wage-led; thus, a rise in the profit share leads 
to a negative effect on growth.  
The Eurozone-12, the UK, the US, Japan, 
Turkey and Korea are wage-led economies. 
Overall, the results indicate that large, rela-
tively closed economies are more likely to be 
wage-led. To illustrate, in the Eurozone-12, a 
1%-point increase in the profit share leads to a 
0.13% decrease in private demand. Germany, 
France, and Italy as individual large members 
of the Eurozone-12 area are also wage-led. The 
4. Consistent with our findings, previous findings for the individ-
ual countries in the literature also mostly conclude that domestic 
demand is wage-led. See Stockhammer et al (2009) for the Euro 
area; Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011) for Germany, France, US, Ja-
pan, Canada, Australia; Naastepad and Storm (2007) for Germany, 
France, Italy, UK; Hein and Vogel (2008) for Germany, France, UK, 
US; Bowles and Boyer (1995) for Germany, France, UK, US, Japan; 
Stockhammer et al (2011) for Germany, and Ederer and Stockham-
mer (2007) for France.
A
P
P
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absolute value of the effect of an increase in the 
profit share on demand in individual countries 
like Germany and France is smaller than in the 
Euro area as a whole because the net export 
effects are higher for these countries. They have 
a much higher export and import share in GDP 
due to trade with the other European countries 
as well as non-European countries, whereas the 
Euro area as a whole is a rather closed economy 
with low extra-EU trade and high intra-EU trade. 
Previous studies show that small open econo-
mies in the Euro area such as the Netherlands 
and Austria may be profit-led, when analysed 
in isolation (Hein and Vogel 2008; Stockhammer 
and Ederer, 2008).  A similar argument could 
apply to the rest of the EU. 
Thus, wage suppression, which keeps real 
wage growth below productivity and leads to 
a fall in the wage share in Europe as a whole is 
likely to have only moderate positive effects on 
trade balances but will have substantial nega-
tive effects on domestic demand.  If wages were 
to change simultaneously in all the EU coun-
tries, the net export position of each country 
would change little because extra-EU trade is 
comparatively small. Thus, when all EU coun-
tries pursue “beggar thy neighbour” policies 
through wage suppression, the international 
competitiveness effects will be minor, while the 
domestic effects will be decisive.  
Canada, Australia, China, South Africa, 
Mexico, Argentina, and India are profit-led. As 
open economies with a high share of exports 
and imports in national income, the net export 
effects are higher in all of these countries.   The 
effects discussed are only the national effects 
in isolation, i.e. assuming that the change is 
taking place only in one single country. The 
last column of Table A.1 summarises the total 
effects, when there is a global race to the 
bottom – a simultaneous 1% decrease in the 
wage share in all of these large developed and 
developing countries. Comparing columns 
E and F, the contraction in the UK, as well as 
other wage-led countries (Eurozone-12, US, 
Japan, Turkey, and Korea) is now much higher. 
In this global race to the bottom scenario, a 
1%-point simultaneous decrease in the wage 
share leads to a decline in the Eurozone-12 by 
0.25% point of GDP. The effect now is economi-
cally far more important.    
The profit-led economies of Canada, 
Mexico, Argentina, and India also begin to 
contract, when the effects of decreasing import 
prices and changes in the GDP of the trade part-
ners on net exports are incorporated in a simul-
taneous race to the bottom scenario. These 
economies could still grow, when they experi-
ence a fall in the wage-share alone, but when 
the wage share falls for all their trade partners, 
the expansionary effect of falling wage shares 
is reversed, as relative competitiveness effects 
are reduced and global demand contracts 
when all countries are implementing a similar 
wage competition strategy.    
A 1%-point simultaneous decline in the 
wage share in the world leads to a decline in 
the global GDP by 0.36%-points (the average 
of the growth rates in column F of Table A.1 
weighted by the share of each country in the 
world GDP). This leads to the conclusion that 
the world economy in aggregate is wage-
led. If there is a simultaneous decline in the 
wage share in all countries (or as in our case 
in the thirteen major economies of the world), 
global aggregate demand also decreases. To 
reformulate the results positively, a 1%-point 
simultaneous increase in the wage share at the 
global level could lead to 0.36%-point higher 
rate of growth in the global GDP.  
To summarise, firstly, domestic private 
demand (the sum of consumption and invest-
ment) is wage-led in all countries because 
consumption is much more sensitive to an 
increase in the profit share than investment 
is. Thus, an economy is profit-led only when 
the effect of distribution on net exports is 
high enough to offset the effects on domestic 
demand. Secondly, foreign trade forms only a 
small portion of aggregate demand in large 
economic areas such as the Eurozone, the UK, 
the US, Japan, and, therefore, the positive 
effects of a decline in the wage share on net 
exports do not suffice to offset the negative 
effects on domestic demand. Similarly, if coun-
tries, which have strong trade relations with 
each other (as within the EU), are considered 
as an aggregate economic area, the private 
demand regime is wage-led. Thirdly, even if 
there are some countries, which are profit-
led, the global economy as a whole is wage-
led because the world is a closed economy. 
Mainstream strategies that impose the same 
wage moderation policies in all countries, 
assume that the world as a whole, as well as 
the majority of countries, are profit-led. This is 
against the logic of our findings given that the 
effects of a fall in the wage share on domestic 
consumption more than offsets the effects on 
investment.
The micro rationale of an individual firm 
cannot be generalised to the macro rationale 
of a country. Individual firms might prefer to 
reduce the labour costs of their own workers 
to increase profits (thereby disregarding the 
effects of this on productivity and morale). At 
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the same time, they would prefer all other firms 
to give a pay raise, so that there is someone to 
buy their goods. Even though a higher profit 
share at the firm level seems to be beneficial 
to individual employers, at the macroeconomic 
level a generalised fall in the wage share gener-
ates a problem of realisation of profits due to 
deficient demand in a wage-led economy. 
Furthermore, even in profit-led countries, a 
global fall in the wage share leads to a global 
aggregate demand deficiency, and potentially 
contraction in the profit-led countries as well. 
A seemingly rational pro-profit strategy at the 
level of an individual firm or a country is hence 
contractionary and counter-productive at the 
macro or global level. 
TABLE A1. SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF A 1%-POINT INCREASE IN THE PROFIT SHARE 
(1%-POINT DECREASE IN THE WAGE SHARE)
THE EFFECT OF A 1%-POINT INCREASE IN THE 
PROFIT SHARE IN ONLY ONE COUNTRY ON
THE EFFECT OF A 
SIMULTANEOUS 1%-POINT 
INCREASE IN THE PROFIT SHARE 
ON % CHANGE IN AGGREGATE 
DEMAND 
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A B C D 
(A+B+C)
E F
EURO AREA-12 -0.439 0.299 0.057 -0.084 -0.133 -0.245
GERMANY -0.501 0.376 0.096 -0.029 -0.031 -
FRANCE -0.305 0.088 0.198 -0.020 -0.027 -
ITALY -0.356 0.130 0.126 -0.100 -0.173 -
UNITED KINGDOM -0.303 0.120 0.158 -0.025 -0.030 -0.214
UNITED STATES -0.426 0.000 0.037 -0.388 -0.808 -0.921
JAPAN -0.353 0.284 0.055 -0.014 -0.034 -0.179
CANADA -0.326 0.182 0.266 0.122 0.148 -0.269
AUSTRALIA -0.256 0.174 0.272 0.190 0.268 0.172
TURKEY -0.491 0.000 0.283 -0.208 -0.459 -0.717
MEXICO -0.438 0.153 0.381 0.096 0.106 -0.111
KOREA -0.422 0.000 0.359 -0.063 -0.115 -0.864
ARGENTINA -0.153 0.015 0.192 0.054 0.075 -0.103
CHINA -0.412 0.000 1.986 1.574 1.932 1.115
INDIA -0.291 0.000 0.310 0.018 0.040 -0.027
SOUTH AFRICA -0.145 0.129 0.506 0.490 0.729 0.390
MEMO ITEM: % CHANGE IN GDP IN G20 (AVERAGE OF COLUMN F 
WEIGHTED BY THE SHARE OF EACH COUNTRY IN G20 GDP) -0.36
Source: Onaran and Galanis (2012),  Is aggregate demand wage-led or profit-led? National and global effects, ILO, Conditions of Work and 
Employment Series No. 31, Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/
wcms_192121.pdf
Note: The global simulation excludes Germany, France and Italy since they are part of the Eurozone
